In the seminal essay (2002) Thomas Carothers contended that the assertion that “…any country moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered a country in transition towards democracy”, was inaccurate. Instead, he argued that many countries labeled as being in a ‘transitional phase’ are actually stuck in what he termed the ‘grey zone,’ with no clear path towards democratic consolidation in the near future. Carothers highlighted Georgia as a pertinent example, with entrenched dominant power system as its primary feature.
More than twenty years later, Carothers’ argument that it is premature to assume such regimes will inevitably progress towards democratic consolidation remains valid. Georgia is still far from achieving consolidated democracy and shows no clear signs of moving towards that direction, contradicting the logic of ‘transitology.’ It is noteworthy, though, that the regime has been far from being static. Instead, it has experienced continuous change and fluctuations, with advances as well as setbacks along the continuum between democracy and authoritarianism. Now, with parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2024, the country finds itself at another transformative juncture, but this time it faces significant risks of slipping back into outright authoritarianism.
There have been more sanguine periods in the modern history of Georgian. The policies and behaviors of the current ruling party, Georgian Dream (GD), were not always so antagonistic to the democratization agenda. Under Georgian Dream's leadership, the country initially made significant advances. The party built its election campaign on a democratic platform, opposed the authoritarian tendencies of Saakashvili’s government, and came to power in Georgia’s first democratic transfer of power since the country regained its independence.
The early years of GD’s rule saw notable progress, reflected in both reforms and the government’s conduct. Arbitrary exercise of state power and human rights abuses, prevalent during Saakashvili’s administration, as well as systemic harassment of businesses and media outlets were significantly reduced. The overall political atmosphere was conducive to the normal functioning of democracy, and the country was the freest in the region. Moreover, GD implemented several significant institutional reforms that aligned with the democratization process. For instance, in 2014, the Georgian government launched a comprehensive decentralization effort, increasing the number of self-governing cities and enhancing the powers of all self-governing bodies through a new code. For some observers, this period suggested that Georgia was finally following the ‘transition’ paradigm.
The optimism, however, was not destined to last long. Progress on the democratization ladder was soon followed by significant setbacks, especially, with the rise of informal rule of Bidzina Ivanishvili what represented a major blow to the country’s nascent democracy. Despite his resignation as prime minister, allegedly, Ivanishvili de facto retained the grip on power and continued to be the ultimate decision maker, including in the appointments of new prime ministers. Although never officially acknowledged, this arrangement was a poorly kept secret. Indeed, little effort was made to conceal it. The establishment of this informal rule, an overtly authoritarian practice that fell short of minimal democratic standards, marked an early departure from genuine efforts to advance democracy.
Later, Georgian Dream slowed, completely halted or even reversed the democratic reforms that had been fervently advocated during their time in opposition, despite continued support and calls by the European Union (EU) and Western partners. The new approach has been aptly described as a form of "cherry-picking" of EU conditionality (Bolkvadze, 2016): the Georgian government pursued only those reforms and policies that did not threaten its hold on power. For example, it selectively implemented judicial reforms—the Achilles' heel of Georgia’s troubled democracy—thereby maintaining ultimate control over the judiciary. The major exception to the trend, has been introduction of the proportional electoral system, which Georgian Dream had resisted for a long time, but ultimately was compelled to adopt.
In parallel, GD invested significant effort into consolidating power and dismantling barriers that impeded its rule, effectively bringing all three branches of government under its control. This often involved redesigning the country’s institutional architecture and, at times, directly removing or sidelining individuals who did not demonstrate unconditional loyalty to Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream. A notable example is the abolition of the State Inspector Service, in 2021, reportedly as a punitive measure against its then acting head. Under her watch, the institution had overseen investigations into the inhumane treatment of former president Mikheil Saakashvili and had determined that the Ministry of Justice and the Special Penitentiary Service violated personal data protection laws.
It should be highlighted that, despite these events and tendencies, for some time, Georgia maintained an environment in which politicians, activists, and citizens could express themselves, organize, gather, or demonstrate with relative freedom. Although the government selectively exercised arbitrary power against political opponents, the political system, overall, continued to preserve considerable freedoms. Despite periodic assaults, civil society and media remained vibrant providing space for political competition. And in the meantime, it can be argued, that the Georgian society, including new generations, grew accustomed to the political and civil freedoms, exercised throughout the years.
If history teaches us anything about modern Georgia and its experience with democratic politics, it is that unchecked and unbalanced power inevitably leads to efforts to concentrate power further and, ultimately, to the emergence of authoritarianism. This cycle, which has repeated itself several times before, resurfaced once again over the past 2-3 years and escalated significantly with Georgian Dream's reintroduction of the "Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence," sparking an unprecedented level of public protest. Despite demonstrations lasting more than two months and criticism from Georgia’s Western partners, GD pressed on and forcefully passed the law. Reminiscent of the law enacted in Russia, (the reason why it has been called “the Russian Law” in Georgia) this bill threatens civil society organizations in Georgia, an area over which GD was not able to exert control. The most striking aspect, though, was the unprecedented level of repressions directed against politicians, civil society activists, and citizens protesting the law, what highlighted the growing risk of authoritarianism. Intimidation calls and violent attacks by organized groups allegedly connected to Georgian Dream, along with physical assaults and a series of illegal imprisonments by the police, had become attributes of GD’s playbook throughout the period of demonstrations. As a result, the rules of the game seem to have changed, with the government showing a willingness to use violence and curtail freedoms when deemed necessary to secure its power. As GD has further unleased increasingly confrontational rhetoric and pledged to ban opposition parties during its ongoing election campaign, further violence and systemic, arbitrary use of power can no longer be ruled out.
It should be highlighted that, in the absence of institutional checks and balances, authoritarian tendencies or attempts by governments in Georgia could be countered by the European Union and United States of America. These actors have enjoyed traction within Georgian society for decades and have exerted significant positive influence on Georgian politics. In the ‘social contract’ between Georgian society and Georgian Dream, the latter was expected to continue the Euro-Atlantic integration effort and move Georgia closer to the European Union and NATO, which implied adherence to Western rules and democratic standards. However, this equation has been disrupted by GD, which in recent years has systematically sought to distance the country from the West. That has accelerated with the introduction of the "Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence," what in essence, seems to have aimed to estrange country with the West, and provide a pretext for launching multilateral foreign policy instead. Indeed, this has been the case since then, with Georgian Dream consistently emphasizing sovereignty and freedom from foreign interference, while also showing significant sympathy towards Russia and other authoritarian actors such as China and Iran.
Against this background, it is evident that the upcoming elections will be highly consequential for Georgia and its citizens. The outcome will determine both the type of regime and the country’s foreign policy trajectory. If the ruling party maintains its grip on power, it is highly likely that Georgia will accelerate its path toward authoritarianism, potentially leading to increased repressions and further suspension of freedoms. Additionally, this scenario would likely result in greater dependence on Russia and a denial of the benefits and opportunities offered by the EU. Conversely, if the opposition emerges victorious and forms a coalition government, the country’s political system could be rebooted, revitalizing democracy and boosting its EU integration efforts. The “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence” would likely be repealed, and civil society could be reinvigorated. However, in neither scenario will be the logic of ‘transitology’ vindicated in the near future. Thomas Carothers' assertion is likely to hold for some time, as Georgia still faces a path full of challenges ahead.
Bibliography
Bolkvadze, K. (2016). Cherry Picking EU Conditionality: Selective Compliance in Georgia’s Hybrid Regime. Europe-Asia Studies, 68(3), 409–440.
Carothers, Thomas (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13 (1), 5-21.
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